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ISSN 1210-3055
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MIČ 49 255
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CONTENTS - VOL. 17, NUMBER 1, June 2007
NORMATIVITY & LEGITIMACY
MIROSLAV POPPER: Introduction
TITUS STAHL: Practices, Norms and Recognition
BERND PRIEN: Naturalistic Description and Normative-Intentional Interpretation
BART ENGELEN: Rationality, Norms and Institutions: In Search of a Realistic
Utopia
LADISLAV HOHO: Globalization and a Normative Framework of Freedom
SAMI PIHLSTROM: Mortality as a Philosophical-Anthropological Issue: Thanatology,
Normativity, and "Human Nature"
ALEXANDER KREMER: Rorty and Normativity
ARTICLES
JASON L. POWELL and MALCOLM CAREY: Social Theory,
Performativity and Professional Power - A Critical Analysis of Helping
Professions in England
BOOK REVIEW
ABSTRACTS
PRACTICES, NORMS AND RECOGNITION
TITUS STAHL
E-mail: stahl@em.uni-frankfurt.de
The problem of the social
foundations of normativity can be illuminated by discussing the narrower
question whether rule-following is necessarily a social matter. The problems
with individualistic theories of rule-following seem to make such a conclusion
unavoidable. Social theories of rule-following, however, seem to only push back
one level the dilemma of having to choose either an infinite regress of
interpretations or a collapse into non-normative descriptions. The most
plausible of these models, Haugeland's conformism, can avoid these objections if
it is supplemented with an ontologically reasonable concept of the collective
attitude of a group. Groups of individuals who are bound to shared norms by
recognizing each other as equipped with a standard authority of criticism have
the necessary properties for ascribing to those groups such collective attitudes.
Given such a weak notion of a collective attitude, there is hope for a plausible
collectivist theory of rule-following.
Pp. 10-21
NATURALISTIC DESCRIPTIONS AND
NORMATIVE-INTENTIONAL INTERPRETATIONS
BERND PRIEN
E-mail: bprien@uni-muenster.de
Normative pragmatists about
linguistic meaning such as Sellars and Brandom have to explain how norms can be
implicit in practices described in purely naturalistic terms. The explanation of
implicit norms usually offered in the literature commits pragmatists to equate
actions with naturalistic events. Since this is an unacceptable consequence, I
propose an alternative explanation of implicit norms that avoids this
identification. To do so, one has to treat the normative-intentional concepts
such as "norm", "action", "sanction", "belief",
"desire" as a holistic system, in the sense that one has to apply all
of them to a given naturalistic practice simultaneously. This result might be
taken to imply that the pragmatist strategy of explaining the content of
assertions and beliefs in terms of norm-governed use is misguided because it
presupposes that one can account for the concept "norm" independently
of the concept "belief". I argue that this consequence does not follow.
Pp. 22-32
RATIONALITY, NORMS AND
INSTITUTIONS: IN SEARCH OF A REALISTIC UTOPIA
BART ENGELEN
E-mail: bart.engelen@econ.kuleuven.be
The main goal of political
philosophers is to search for a realistic utopia by taking individuals as they
are and institutions, rules and laws as they might be. Instead of trying to
change either individuals or institutions in order to improve society, this
article argues that both strategies should be combined, since there are causal
connections running both ways. Because individuals ultimately devise and uphold
institutions, one should be optimistic about the possibilities of deliberately
improving society through institutional reforms. However, one should adequately
model the influences that these reforms have on individuals, their identities
and their motivations. From the fact that individuals can actually turn into
egoists if they are treated as such, this article stresses the need to detect
and maintain non-egoistic motivations. Since informal norms, for example,
motivate individuals to socially desirable action, it is important to devise
formal institutions that support rather than erode norm-guided behavior.
Pp. 33-41
GLOBALIZATION AND A NORMATIVE
FRAMEWORK OF FREEDOM
LADISLAV HOHO
E-mail: ladislav.hohos@gmail.com
The author considers the question of
whether or even what normative structure of social order is able to encourage
the advancement of the measure of positive liberty in the process of
globalization. Related to this is the issue of the insufficiency of guarantees
provided by orthodox liberalism for human self-determination. The author
considers possible scenarios as to the way in which an elite cosmopolitan
minority, profiting from globalization and feeling no responsibility for the
majority left to its own fate, would pursue its own interests. The ideas of Ralf
Dahrendorf concerning the global rule of law in the name of freedom and the need
for international law are referred to. Globalization is occurring just as Marx
intuitively predicted: capitalism becomes the bearer of hidden immanent
self-destructive mechanisms. In conclusion, the author's hypothesis is that the
new era of law in the 21st century will ensure that certain civilization legal
norms become natural or customary.
Pp. 42-53
MORTALITY AS A
PHILOSOPHICAL-ANTHROPOLOGICAL ISSUE: THANATOLOGY, NORMATIVITY, AND "HUMAN
NATURE"
SAMI PIHLSTRÖM
E-mail: sami.pihlstrom@uta.fi
This paper examines mortality-the
fact that we humans are all going to die-as an issue in philosophical
anthropology, by applying a fourfold typology of some key forms of philosophical
anthropology to the topic of death and mortality. First, this typology,
originally suggested by Heikki Kannisto, is outlined; the mortality issue is,
then, viewed from the perspective it opens. Finally, the challenges to our
understanding of death and mortality that this perspective may help us meet are
discussed. The treatment of mortality from the perspective of philosophical
anthropology may make it more understandable in a manner that will highlight the
importance of the concept of normativity in the philosophical examination of any
such humanly relevant issue.
Pp. 54-70
RORTY AND NORMATIVITY
ALEXANDER KREMER
E-mail: alexanderkremer2000@yahoo.com
The paper summarizes some of the
main ideas in Rorty's philosophy and indicates the views he holds on normativity.
As a neopragmatic thinker, Rorty wants as little normativity as possible, but
this does not mean that he rejects all types of normativity.
Pp. 71-77
SOCIAL THEORY, PERFORMATIVITY AND
PROFESSIONAL POWER-A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF HELPING PROFESSIONS IN ENGLAND
JASON L. POWELL, MALCOLM CAREY
E-mail: jasonpwll@aol.com
Drawing from interviews and
ethnographic research, evidence is provided to suggest a sense of "anxiety"
and "regret" amongst state social workers and case managers working on
the "front-line" within local authority social service departments.
There have been a number of theoretical approaches that have attempted to ground
the concept of "power" to understand organizational practice though
Foucauldian insights have been most captivating in illuminating power relations
and subject positioning. In order to theoretically interrogate the relationship
between social theory and professional power, we draw from the neo-Foucauldian
work of American Social Philosopher Judith Butler - especially regarding
Butler's (1990, 1993 and 1998) powerful work on "performativity" and
its relationship to social work. We also attempt to examine the "distances"
between the social work role and social workers narratives through an
examination of notions of "anxiety" and "regret" in the face
of the professionalisation of state social work.
Pp. 78-94
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