ISSN 1210-3055

MIČ 49 255     


HUMAN AFFAIRS
HOME | CALL FOR PAPERS | ARCHIVES | SUBSCRIPTION | INSTRUCTION FOR CONTRIBUTORS | TOPICAL NUMBER

CONTENTS - VOL. 17, NUMBER 1, June 2007

NORMATIVITY & LEGITIMACY

MIROSLAV POPPER: Introduction

TITUS STAHL: Practices, Norms and Recognition
BERND PRIEN: Naturalistic Description and Normative-Intentional Interpretation
BART ENGELEN: Rationality, Norms and Institutions: In Search of a Realistic Utopia
LADISLAV HOHOŠ: Globalization and a Normative Framework of Freedom
SAMI PIHLSTROM: Mortality as a Philosophical-Anthropological Issue: Thanatology, Normativity, and "Human Nature"
ALEXANDER KREMER: Rorty and Normativity

ARTICLES

JASON L. POWELL and MALCOLM CAREY: Social Theory, Performativity and Professional Power - A Critical Analysis of Helping Professions in England

BOOK REVIEW


ABSTRACTS


PRACTICES, NORMS AND RECOGNITION
TITUS STAHL

E-mail: stahl@em.uni-frankfurt.de

The problem of the social foundations of normativity can be illuminated by discussing the narrower question whether rule-following is necessarily a social matter. The problems with individualistic theories of rule-following seem to make such a conclusion unavoidable. Social theories of rule-following, however, seem to only push back one level the dilemma of having to choose either an infinite regress of interpretations or a collapse into non-normative descriptions. The most plausible of these models, Haugeland's conformism, can avoid these objections if it is supplemented with an ontologically reasonable concept of the collective attitude of a group. Groups of individuals who are bound to shared norms by recognizing each other as equipped with a standard authority of criticism have the necessary properties for ascribing to those groups such collective attitudes. Given such a weak notion of a collective attitude, there is hope for a plausible collectivist theory of rule-following.

Pp. 10-21


NATURALISTIC DESCRIPTIONS AND NORMATIVE-INTENTIONAL INTERPRETATIONS
BERND PRIEN

E-mail: bprien@uni-muenster.de

Normative pragmatists about linguistic meaning such as Sellars and Brandom have to explain how norms can be implicit in practices described in purely naturalistic terms. The explanation of implicit norms usually offered in the literature commits pragmatists to equate actions with naturalistic events. Since this is an unacceptable consequence, I propose an alternative explanation of implicit norms that avoids this identification. To do so, one has to treat the normative-intentional concepts such as "norm", "action", "sanction", "belief", "desire" as a holistic system, in the sense that one has to apply all of them to a given naturalistic practice simultaneously. This result might be taken to imply that the pragmatist strategy of explaining the content of assertions and beliefs in terms of norm-governed use is misguided because it presupposes that one can account for the concept "norm" independently of the concept "belief". I argue that this consequence does not follow.

Pp. 22-32


RATIONALITY, NORMS AND INSTITUTIONS: IN SEARCH OF A REALISTIC UTOPIA
BART ENGELEN

E-mail: bart.engelen@econ.kuleuven.be

The main goal of political philosophers is to search for a realistic utopia by taking individuals as they are and institutions, rules and laws as they might be. Instead of trying to change either individuals or institutions in order to improve society, this article argues that both strategies should be combined, since there are causal connections running both ways. Because individuals ultimately devise and uphold institutions, one should be optimistic about the possibilities of deliberately improving society through institutional reforms. However, one should adequately model the influences that these reforms have on individuals, their identities and their motivations. From the fact that individuals can actually turn into egoists if they are treated as such, this article stresses the need to detect and maintain non-egoistic motivations. Since informal norms, for example, motivate individuals to socially desirable action, it is important to devise formal institutions that support rather than erode norm-guided behavior.

Pp. 33-41


GLOBALIZATION AND A NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK OF FREEDOM
LADISLAV HOHOŠ

E-mail: ladislav.hohos@gmail.com

The author considers the question of whether or even what normative structure of social order is able to encourage the advancement of the measure of positive liberty in the process of globalization. Related to this is the issue of the insufficiency of guarantees provided by orthodox liberalism for human self-determination. The author considers possible scenarios as to the way in which an elite cosmopolitan minority, profiting from globalization and feeling no responsibility for the majority left to its own fate, would pursue its own interests. The ideas of Ralf Dahrendorf concerning the global rule of law in the name of freedom and the need for international law are referred to. Globalization is occurring just as Marx intuitively predicted: capitalism becomes the bearer of hidden immanent self-destructive mechanisms. In conclusion, the author's hypothesis is that the new era of law in the 21st century will ensure that certain civilization legal norms become natural or customary.

Pp. 42-53


MORTALITY AS A PHILOSOPHICAL-ANTHROPOLOGICAL ISSUE: THANATOLOGY, NORMATIVITY, AND "HUMAN NATURE"
SAMI PIHLSTRÖM

E-mail: sami.pihlstrom@uta.fi

This paper examines mortality-the fact that we humans are all going to die-as an issue in philosophical anthropology, by applying a fourfold typology of some key forms of philosophical anthropology to the topic of death and mortality. First, this typology, originally suggested by Heikki Kannisto, is outlined; the mortality issue is, then, viewed from the perspective it opens. Finally, the challenges to our understanding of death and mortality that this perspective may help us meet are discussed. The treatment of mortality from the perspective of philosophical anthropology may make it more understandable in a manner that will highlight the importance of the concept of normativity in the philosophical examination of any such humanly relevant issue.

Pp. 54-70


RORTY AND NORMATIVITY
ALEXANDER KREMER

E-mail: alexanderkremer2000@yahoo.com

The paper summarizes some of the main ideas in Rorty's philosophy and indicates the views he holds on normativity. As a neopragmatic thinker, Rorty wants as little normativity as possible, but this does not mean that he rejects all types of normativity.

Pp. 71-77


SOCIAL THEORY, PERFORMATIVITY AND PROFESSIONAL POWER-A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF HELPING PROFESSIONS IN ENGLAND
JASON L. POWELL, MALCOLM CAREY

E-mail: jasonpwll@aol.com

Drawing from interviews and ethnographic research, evidence is provided to suggest a sense of "anxiety" and "regret" amongst state social workers and case managers working on the "front-line" within local authority social service departments. There have been a number of theoretical approaches that have attempted to ground the concept of "power" to understand organizational practice though Foucauldian insights have been most captivating in illuminating power relations and subject positioning. In order to theoretically interrogate the relationship between social theory and professional power, we draw from the neo-Foucauldian work of American Social Philosopher Judith Butler - especially regarding Butler's (1990, 1993 and 1998) powerful work on "performativity" and its relationship to social work. We also attempt to examine the "distances" between the social work role and social workers narratives through an examination of notions of "anxiety" and "regret" in the face of the professionalisation of state social work.

Pp. 78-94

Back > >



EUROPE | SLOVAKIA | BRATISLAVA

Š Department of Social & Biological Communication Slovak Academy of Sciences, Bratislava
Electronic version is available via Internet and GSM: www.humanaffairs.sk, wap.humanaffairs.sk
Reg. No. 648/92

MADE IN SLOVAKIA


NAJ.sk

Facebook

Mgr. Peter Krákorník - AKRONET