CONTENTS - VOL. 19, NUMBER 2,
June 2009
CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY OF
SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC REALISM AND BEYOND
Guest Editor: DIMITRI GINEV
DIMITRI GINEV: Introductory:
Perspectives on Reality and "The World" in the Realism Debate ... 111
MICHAEL BRADIE: What's Wrong with Methodological Naturalism? ... 126
TIMOTHY D. LYONS: Criteria for Attributing Predictive Responsibility in the
Scientific Realism Debate: Deployment, Essentiality, Belief, Retention ... 138
HAROLD I. BROWN: Interpretation, Constraint, and the Prospects of Scientific
Realism ... 153
JOSEPH MARGOLIS: Tensions Regarding Epistemic Concepts ... 169
VÁCLAV ČERNÍK, JOZEF VICENÍK: Historical Narrative: A Dispute between
Constructionism and Scientific Realism ... 182
PAUL STENNER: On the Actualities and Possibilities of Constructionism: Towards
Deep Empiricism ... 194
GREGOR SCHIEMANN: Realism in Context: The Examples of Lifeworld and Quantum
Physics ... 211
ROBERT CREASE: Covariant Realism ... 223
BOOK REVIEW ESSAY
VALÉRIA REGECOVÁ: Three Things about the Good Life ... 233
ABSTRACTS
INTRODUCTORY: PERSPECTIVES ON
REALITY AND "THE WORLD" IN THE REALISM DEBATE
DIMITRI GINEV
DOI: 10.2478/v10023-009-0027-7
E-mail: dimiginev@yahoo.com
Abstract: One of the "characteristic
parameters" dividing up analytical and Continental philosophizing is the
interpretation of the concepts of "reality" and "the world".
The paper offers an analysis of this characteristic parameter with regard to the
relations between epistemologically centred and hermeneutically oriented
doctrines of realism.
Keywords: hermeneutic construal of
the world; interrelatedness of practices; interpretative appropriation of
possibilities.
Pp. 111-125
WHAT'S WRONG WITH METHODOLOGICAL
NATURALISM?
MICHAEL BRADIE
DOI: 10.2478/v10023-009-0028-6
E-mail: mbradie@bgsu.edu
Abstract: The compatibility of
Darwinism with religious beliefs has been the subject of vigorous debate from
1859 to the present day. Darwin himself did not think that there was any
incompatibility between his theory of natural selection and the existence of God.
However, he did not think that appeals to the direct or indirect activity of a
Creator substantially increased our understanding of any natural phenomenon. In
effect, Darwin endorsed what we would today label as "methodological
naturalism,' roughly the view that the only legitimate elements of the
explanation of natural phenomena must appeal only to natural processes, natural
laws and natural regularities. In section 2, Darwin's commitment to
methodological Darwinism is documented. Section 3 addresses the question of
whether methodological naturalism does or does not rule out belief in a divine
Creator. Section 4 raises the question of whether methodological naturalists are
also metaphysical naturalists. Finally, section 5 assesses the warrant for
expanding the scope of 'science' to include non-naturalistic factors.
Keywords: methodological and
metaphysical naturalism; theistic science; secondary causation view.
Pp.126-137
CRITERIA FOR ATTRIBUTING
PREDICTIVE RESPONSIBILITY IN THE SCIENTIFIC REALISM DEBATE: DEPLOYMENT,
ESSENTIALITY, BELIEF, RETENTION
TIMOTHY D. LYONS
DOI: 10.2478/v10023-009-0029-5
E-mail: tdlyons@iupui.edu
Abstract: The most promising
contemporary form of epistemic scientific realism is based on the following
intuition: Belief should be directed, not toward theories as wholes, but toward
particular theoretical constituents that are responsible for, or deployed in,
key successes. While the debate on deployment realism is quite fresh, a
significant degree of confusion has already entered into it. Here I identify
five criteria that have sidetracked that debate. Setting these distractions
aside, I endeavor to redirect the attention of both realists and non-realists to
the fundamental intuition above. In more detail: I show that Stathis Psillos
(1999) has offered an explicit criterion for picking out particular constituents,
which, contrary to Kyle Stanford's (2006) criticisms, neither assumes the truth
of theories nor requires hindsight. I contend, however, that, in Psillos's case
studies, Psillos has not successfully applied his explicit criterion. After
clarifying the various alternative criteria at work (in those case studies and
in a second line of criticism offered by Stanford), I argue that, irrespective
of Stanford's criticisms, the explicit criterion Psillos does offer is not an
acceptable one. Nonetheless, the deployment realist's fundamental intuition
withstands all of these challenges. In closing, I point in a direction toward
which I've elsewhere focused, suggesting that, despite the legitimacy and
applicability of the deployment realist's intuition, the historical threat that
prompted it remains.
Keywords: constituents deployed in
key successful predictions; criterion of essentiality; empirical testability.
Pp. 138-152
INTERPRETATION, CONSTRAINT, AND
THE PROSPECTS OF SCIENTIFIC REALISM
HAROLD I. BROWN
DOI: 10.2478/v10023-009-0030-z
E-mail: hibrown@niu.edu
Abstract: I explore the interaction
between theory-based interpretations of scientific evidence and constraints on
theories provided by that evidence. Interpretation is often viewed as a source
of error and a reason for scepticism about scientific results. But, I argue,
while interpretation does generate epistemic risk, it also points to new sources
of evidence that can constrain our theories. This is especially clear in the
development of instrumentation that increases the range of our interactions with
nature. While the design of such instruments and the interpretation of their
outputs are deeply dependent on theory-based interpretations, these outputs can
still challenge those very theories. At the same time, theory-guided
instrumentation provides us access to aspects of nature that we cannot study
with our unaided senses. This access allows us to extend the range of evidence
that we collect, and thus increases the constraints on our theories. As a result,
theory-guided evidence collection has a positive impact on the prospects of
scientific realism since these increasing constraints on our theories provide
our only reason for thinking that we may be approaching the development of true
theories.
Keywords: theory-dependence thesis;
empirical evidence; incommensurability.
Pp. 153-168
TENSIONS REGARDING EPISTEMIC
CONCEPTS
JOSEPH MARGOLIS
DOI: 10.2478/v10023-009-0031-y
E-mail: josephmargolis455@hotmail.com
Abstract: The paper argues that
there is no logic of scientific discovery, but there is an inference-like
pattern that we can model as a "logic," retrospectively, once a
discovery has been successfully made. While accepting a kind of epistemological
pluralism and opportunism, the claim will be advocated that a convergent and
reasonably wide-ranging normative "logic" might be constructed, one
that might even work reasonably well in selected applications and might (therefore)
also lead us to make congruent judgments of irrationality or illogicality
wherever it seems not to yield the "normatively appropriate" outcomes
in otherwise comparable specimen cases.
Keywords: representationalist form
of scientific realism; internal realism; incommensurability, logic of material
inference.
Pp. 169-181
HISTORICAL NARRATIVE: A DISPUTE
BETWEEN CONSTRUCTIONISM AND SCIENTIFIC REALISM
VACLAV ČERNÍK AND JOZEF VICENÍK
DOI: 10.2478/v10023-009-0032-x
E-mail: filovice@savba.sk
Abstract: An intense discussion
about the issue of historical narrative arose during the time when the
na?ve realism of classical historiography was being critiqued and led to a
dispute, in the last century, between
constructionism and critical or scientific realism. We can distinguish between
constructionism and noetic
constructivism. According to ontological constructionism all facts are human
constructions; according to
noetic constructivism, our notions and theories are constructs with objective
meaning (sense and reference);
they refer to objective reality. Scientific realism recognizes the existence of
noetic construction but does
not regard facts as our constructions, as pure fictions. The point of contention
is the question over whether
historical narrative is merely a discursive construction or whether it is also a
scientific reconstruction of the
past. Resolving the dispute over whether historical narrative can be objectively
true, or whether it is subject to
empirical control or not, is dependent on finding the answer to this question.
Keywords: historical narrative;
ontological constructionism; noetic constructivism; scientific realism.
Pp.182-193
ON THE ACTUALITIES AND
POSSIBILITIES OF CONSTRUCTIONISM: TOWARDS DEEP EMPIRICISM
PAUL STENNER
DOI: 10.2478/v10023-009-0033-9
E-mail: P.Stenner@brighton.ac.uk
Abstract: Drawing from the example
of critical psychology, this paper examines how dissatisfaction with an existing
scientific paradigm can stimulate interest in philosophy and social theory. The
emergence of a social constructionist understanding of scientific knowledge in
prominent dialects of critical psychology is related to a combination of
scientific and political concerns, and briefly set in the context of three
important strands of twentieth century philosophy: existential hermeneutics,
ordinary language philosophy and poststructuralism. These strands agree on at
least two issues: the rejection of metaphysics and the ontological foregrounding
of the notion of discourse or language-in-use. These philosophies have
influenced the development of discursive methods and constructionist
epistemologies in special sciences such as psychology and sociology. It is
suggested, however, that both the commitment against metaphysics and the
prioritising of discourse are problematic, and that a process metaphysics based
on the three pillars of possibility, mediation and actuality (or pattern, matrix
and activity) might be articulated in order to overcome the bifurcation of
nature tacitly accepted by the commitment to a discursive ontology.
Keywords: p/m grammar distinction;
social constructionism; constructivist metaphysics; potentiality; actuality.
Pp. 194-210
REALISM IN CONTEXT: THE EXAMPLES
OF LIFEWORLD AND QUANTUM PHYSICS
GREGOR SCHIEMANN
DOI: 10.2478/v10023-009-0034-8
E-mail: schiemann@uni-wuppertal.de
Abstract: Lifeworld realism and
quantum-physical realism are taken as experience-dependent conceptions of the
world that become objects of explicit reflection when confronted with
context-external discourses. After a brief sketch of the two contexts of
experience-lifeworld and quantum physics-and their realist interpretations, I
will discuss the quantum world from the perspective of lifeworld realism. From
this perspective, the quantum world-roughly speaking-has to be either unreal or
else constitute a different reality. Then, I invert the perspective and examine
the lifeworld from the standpoint of quantumphysical realism. This conception of
the lifeworld has gained momentum from new research results in recent decades.
Despite its experiential basis, quantum-physical realism bears an ambiguity akin
to that of lifeworld realism. While the perspectival inversion serves to
highlight the problem, it also contributes to an improved understanding of
lifeworld-realism.
Keywords: lifeworld; quantum physics;
philosophy of science; realism.
Pp. 211-222
COVARIANT REALISM
ROBERT CREASE
DOI: 10.2478/v10023-009-0035-7
E-mail: rcrease@notes.cc.sunysb.edu
Abstract: Hermeneutic phenomenology
of science implies a particular version of realism. It approaches scientific
entities in a twofold perspective: in their relation to other parts of the
theory (as elements in a theoretical "language"), and in relation to
the lifeworld as mediated by laboratory practices; as "fulfilled" in
laboratory situations that "produce" worldly objects. The question
then arises of the relation between the two perspectives; as Ginev has pointed
out, there is danger of a theoretical essentialism which is implied when the
mathematical projection is conceived as operationalized by experiment. Ginev's
proposal to avoid this involves the concept of "inscription." This
paper proposes another approach, covariant realism, which draws from Heidegger's
notion of formal indication and which makes explicit the temporality of
theoretical objects in the flow of the research process. Formal indication does
not so much describe phenomena as call them to our attention in a way that we
can activate ourselves (as in laboratory contexts); it characterizes phenomena
which are understood to be provisionally grasped, already interpreted, and
anticipated as able to show themselves differently in different contexts. The
value of this approach suggests deeper possibilities for hermeneutic
phenomenology of science than have hitherto been explored.
Keywords: hermeneutic phenomenology
of science; hermeneutic approach to realism; formal indication.
Pp. 223-232
